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also distinguished from gender non-conformism, gender diversity or transsexualism as, in addition to
identifying and living as one’s non-natal gender, it involves ‘clinically significant distress’. Unfortunately,
children with gender dysphoria (and indeed many gender diverse young people) are almost by definition
at a high risk of depression and anxiety, as well as social isolation, self-harm and suicide. This is
unsurprisingly often connected to the discrimination and abuse suffered by these groups.
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CHILDREN WITH GENDER DYSPHORIA AND THE
JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY COURT

FELICITY BELL *
P0F

I INTRODUCTION
Gender dysphoria is described as ‘[m]ental distress caused by unhappiness
with one’s own sex and the desire to be identified as the opposite sex’. 1 Gender
dysphoria is distinguished from being intersex, the subject of a recent Australian
Senate Committee report, which is referable to physical characteristics.2 It is also
distinguished from gender non-conformism, gender diversity or transsexualism3
as, in addition to identifying and living as one’s non-natal gender, it involves
‘clinically significant distress’. 4 Unfortunately, children with gender dysphoria
(and indeed many gender diverse young people) are almost by definition at a
high risk of depression and anxiety, as well as social isolation, self-harm and
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Lecturer, School of Law, University of Wollongong. Thanks to Ian Lawson, Dr Linda Steele, and the two
anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts. All opinions and errors are my own.
Senate Community Affairs References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Involuntary or Coerced
Sterilisation of Intersex People in Australia (2013) 55 [3.68] n 85. The term ‘gender dysphoria’ is
preferred here over ‘gender identity disorder’ – the latter terminology has been abandoned in the most
recent Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5. See American Psychiatric
Association, Gender Dysphoria (Fact Sheet, 2013) 1 <http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/Gender%20
Dysphoria%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf>.
Senate Community Affairs References Committee, above n 1, 1–2 [1.6].
There is a wide and fluctuating range of terms used by the gender diverse and transgender communities:
see, eg, the glossary in Elizabeth Smith et al, From Blues to Rainbows: The Mental Health and WellBeing of Gender Diverse and Transgender Young People in Australia (Australian Research Centre in
Sex, Health and Society, La Trobe University and University of New England, 2014) 6–7. I use the term
‘gender dysphoria’ to describe the very particular situation of the children and young people in the
Family Court cases and ‘gender diverse’ to capture a broader range of ‘non-conforming’ gender
identities.
American Psychiatric Association, Gender Dysphoria, above n 1, 1.
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suicide. 5 This is unsurprisingly often connected to the discrimination and abuse
suffered by these groups.
It is now more readily accepted, and due to advances in medical technology,
easier than ever before for persons with gender dysphoria to alter their own
physical characteristics to more closely conform to their inner gender or identity,
a process often referred to as ‘transition’. 6 This may occur through hormone
therapy or through surgical procedures. 7
There is an expansive literature concerning the role which law plays in
regulating sexual and gender identity, including in diverse gender communities.
Scholarship around transgender communities and the law has examined areas
such as discrimination and violence against gender diverse people,8 and access to
appropriate healthcare, including for young people. 9 For gender diverse youth,
school, community and even family may be sites of oppression and victimisation:
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Smith et al, above n 3. They report that of the gender diverse young people in their study, ‘[e]ighty-one
per cent (n = 104) … who had experienced abuse and/or discrimination due to their gender expression
had thought about suicide and 37 [per cent] had made suicide attempts’: at 67. See also American
Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-5 (5th ed, 2013)
451–460; Jacqueline K Hewitt et al, ‘Hormone Treatment of Gender Identity Disorder in a Cohort of
Children and Adolescents’ (2012) 196 Medical Journal of Australia 578, 578, 581; Michelle Henderson,
Kids with Gender Issues Suffer Depression, NineMSN (online), 21 May 2012 <http://www.9news.
com.au/technology/2012/10/10/10/ 47/kids-with-gender-issues-suffer-depression>, reporting that every
child treated at Australia’s first clinic for childhood gender dysphoria was suffering depression and
anxiety; Rita Lee, ‘Health Care Problems of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Patients’ (2000)
172 Western Journal of Medicine 403, 403, reporting that 40 per cent of lesbian, gay, bisexual or
transgender youth have either attempted or seriously contemplated suicide; Mary Huft, ‘Statistically
Speaking: The High Rate of Suicidality among Transgender Youth and Access Barriers to Medical
Treatment in a Society of Gender Dichotomy’ (2008) 28(1) Children’s Legal Rights Journal 53, 53.
Smith et al, above n 3, 39; Erika Skougard, ‘The Best Interests of Transgender Children’ [2011] Utah
Law Review 1161, 1169–72.
Hewitt et al, above n 5, 578; Bram Kuiper and Peggy Cohen-Kettenis, ‘Sex Reassignment Surgery: A
Study of 141 Dutch Transsexuals’ (1988) 17 Archives of Sexual Behavior 439; F Leavitt et al,
‘Presurgical Adjustment in Male Transsexuals With and Without Hormonal Treatment’ (1980) 168
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 693.
Laura Grenfell and Anne Hewitt, ‘Gender Regulation: Restrictive, Facilitative or Transformative Laws?’
(2012) 34 Sydney Law Review 761; Alex Sharpe, ‘Criminalising Sexual Intimacy: Transgender
Defendants and the Legal Construction of Non-consent’ [2014] Criminal Law Review 207; Abigail W
Lloyd, ‘Defining the Human: Are Transgender People Strangers to the Law?’ (2005) 20 Berkeley Journal
of Gender, Law & Justice 150; Andrew N Sharpe and Leslie J Moran, ‘Violence, Identity and Policing:
The Case of Violence against Transgender People’ (2004) 4 Criminal Justice 395; Andrew Alston,
‘Transgender Rights as Legal Rights’ (1999) 7 Canterbury Law Review 329; Nan Seuffert, ‘Reflections
on Transgender Immigration’ (2009) 18 Griffith Law Review 428.
Huft, above n 5; Amanda Kennedy, ‘Because We Say So: The Unfortunate Denial of Rights to
Transgender Minors Regarding Transitions’ (2008) 19 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 281; Sonja
Shield, ‘The Doctor Won’t See You Now: Rights of Transgender Adolescents to Sex Reassignment
Treatment’ (2007) 31 New York University Review of Law & Social Change 361. See also Holly V
Franson, ‘The Rise of the Transgender Child: Overcoming Societal Stigma, Institutional Discrimination,
and Individual Bias to Enact and Enforce Nondiscriminatory Dress Code Policies’ (2013) 84 University
of Colorado Law Review 497.
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in Australia, the extension of formal legal protections to these groups is relatively
recent. 10 The broader context of some work has been to challenge the law’s
promulgation of binary conceptions of gender and to promote ideas about rights
to gender equality and self-determination. 11 It is against such a backdrop that this
article seeks to explore one particular aspect of the legal regulation of gender
diversity which concerns young people’s access to hormone therapy in Australia.
While it is difficult to obtain estimates about the prevalence of gender
dysphoria in the population, 12 greater attention has been paid in recent years to
manifestations of gender dysphoria in children and adolescents, both in
Australian popular media 13 and in scholarly journals. 14 The intensity of gender
dysphoria experienced by young children is a predictor of its continuance, 15 and
gender dysphoria that persists into adolescence is more likely to continue into
adulthood. 16 As puberty is the time at which children begin to develop adult
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Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) ss 5A–5C, as inserted by Sex Discrimination Amendment (Sexual
Orientation, Gender Identity and Intersex Status) Act 2013 (Cth) sch 1 cl 17; see also Grenfell and
Hewitt, above n 8, 778–82.
See, eg, P L Chau and Jonathan Herring, ‘Defining, Assigning and Designing Sex’ (2002) 16
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 327; Chinyere Ezie, ‘Deconstructing the Body:
Transgender and Intersex Identities and Sex Discrimination – The Need for Strict Scrutiny’ (2011) 20
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 141; Amy D Ronner, ‘Let’s Get the “Trans” and “Sex” Out of It
and Free Us All’ (2013) 16 Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 859. See also the sources cited in nn 8–9
of this article.
‘For natal adult males, prevalence ranges from 0.005% to 0.014%, and for natal females, from 0.002% to
0.003%. Since not all adults seeking hormone treatment and surgical reassignment attend specialty
clinics, these rates are likely modest underestimates’: American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5, above n
5, 454.
Four Corners: Being Me (Directed by Janine Cohen and Catherine Scott, Australian Broadcasting
Corporation, 2014) <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2014/11/17/4127631.htm>; Simon Lauder,
‘Teen Cross Gender Clinic Calls for More Services’, ABC News (online), 21 May 2012
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-05-21/teen-cross-gender-clinic-calls-for-more-services/4024426>;
Paul Chai, ‘Just a Girl, in the World’, The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 9 September 2012
<http://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/just-a-girl-in-the-world-20120908-25c80.html>; ‘Gender Disorder
Affects Girls Too’, The Australian (Sydney) 5 June 2013; Jeannette Francis, ‘How Young Is Too Young
To Change Sex?’, SBS World News (online), 1 May 2013 <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2013/05/
01/how-young-too-young-change-sex>; Myfanwy McDonald, ‘Don’t Demonise Doctors for Treating
Gender Identity Disorder’, The Conversation (online), 9 April 2013 <http://theconversation.com/dontdemonise-doctors-for-treating-gender-identity-disorder-9593>.
Hewitt et al, above n 5; Norman P Spack et al, ‘Children and Adolescents with Gender Identity Disorder
Referred to a Pediatric Medical Center’ (2012) 129 Pediatrics 418; Peggy T Cohen-Kettenis, Thomas D
Steensma and Annelou L de Vries, ‘Treatment of Adolescents with Gender Dysphoria in the Netherlands’
(2011) 20 Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 689; Annelou L C de Vries et al, ‘Puberty Suppression in
Adolescents with Gender Identity Disorder: A Prospective Follow-Up Study’ (2011) 8 Journal of Sexual
Medicine 2276; Thomas D Steensma et al, ‘Factors Associated with Desistence and Persistence of
Childhood Gender Dysphoria: A Quantitative Follow-Up Study’ (2013) 52 Journal of the American
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 582.
Steensma et al, ‘Quantitative Follow-Up Study’, above n 14, 583, 586–8.
Madeleine S C Wallien and Peggy T Cohen-Kettenis, ‘Psychosexual Outcome of Gender-Dysphoric
Children’ (2008) 47 Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 1413, 1420–1.
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physical characteristics, a treatment option for children with gender dysphoria is
to suppress the onset of puberty through the use of hormones, 17 and subsequently
to commence further hormone treatment so as to promote the development of
non-natal physical attributes. 18
Typically, when children or people with disabilities cannot agree to receiving
medical treatment due to an inability to give informed consent, parents or
guardians may authorise treatment instead, but not all treatment. In Secretary,
Department of Health and Community Services v JWB (‘Marion’s Case’), 19 the
High Court held that there are some categories of medical procedure to which
parents or guardians may not consent. In that case, the majority found that the
procedure in question, the sterilisation of an intellectually disabled girl, was
outside the scope of parental authorisation. 20
Applying Marion’s Case to a different set of circumstances, the Family Court
determined in Re Alex that hormone therapy for a child with gender dysphoria is
similarly outside the bounds of parental consent. 21 Accordingly, hormone therapy
could only commence with the approval of the Court, notwithstanding that a
child, his or her family and his or her treating medical practitioners may all have
been in agreement as to the course of treatment proposed. 22
In 2013, the Full Court of the Family Court reconsidered this position in Re
Jamie, 23 an appeal from a decision of Dessau J wherein her Honour authorised
hormone treatment for a 10-year-old child, Jamie, with gender dysphoria. 24
Jamie’s parents did not contest the effect of Justice Dessau’s decision, but rather
claimed that they already possessed the right to authorise treatment on Jamie’s
behalf, this being an aspect of parental responsibility. Accordingly, they
challenged the Court’s jurisdiction to authorise this kind of treatment. 25 The
result was a modification, but not abandonment, of the need for court
authorisation, wherein a guardian may authorise the first ‘stage’ of treatment but
not the second.
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Specifically, gonadotrophin-releasing hormone analogue: see Royal College of Psychiatrists, ‘Good
Practice Guidelines for the Assessment and Treatment of Adults with Gender Dysphoria’ (College Report
No 181, 2013) 20. This is often referred to as ‘stage one’ treatment.
This is sometimes referred to as ‘cross-sex hormone therapy’ or ‘stage two’ treatment: Peggy T CohenKettenis and Stephanie H M van Goozen, ‘Sex Reassignment of Adolescent Transsexuals: A Follow-Up
Study’ (1997) 36 Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 263, 265; Marshall
Dahl et al, ‘Physical Aspects of Transgender Endocrine Therapy’ (2006) 9(3–4) International Journal of
Transgenderism 111, 112, 117, 121.
(1992) 175 CLR 218.
Ibid 249–54 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89. Note that all decisions of the family law courts utilise pseudonyms for
minors.
As discussed below, where a child’s guardians or doctors do not agree is a situation in which the court’s
powers are more appropriately required: see Part V.
(2013) 278 FLR 155.
Re Jamie (Special Medical Procedure) [2011] FamCA 248.
Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 157 [4] (Bryant CJ).
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The extension of the ratio in Marion’s Case to children with gender
dysphoria has both practical and symbolic implications. The practical effect is to
place a time-consuming, expensive and stressful hurdle in the path of young
people who are seeking treatment, and their families. 26 It is ironic that, given the
discursive focus on ‘hearing’ children and upholding children’s rights in the
family law jurisdiction, 27 the requirement to seek court authorisation adds an
additional layer of anxiety and uncertainty for individual children already caught
up in a very confusing time in their lives.
On a symbolic level, the concern surrounding cases of childhood gender
dysphoria and the restrictions placed on access to treatment illustrate how illequipped the Family Court is to deal with childhood manifestations of sexuality
and gender identity. It is hard to imagine that adolescents would be unable to
pursue treatment if suffering another type of psychological condition carrying
such devastating potential consequences, 28 raising the question of why this
particular treatment is so highly regulated. This is especially so when the
decision in Marion’s Case does not compel the approach taken by the Family
Court. By cementing its jurisdictional reach, the Court has positioned itself as
part of the machinery of social regulation of non-normative gender identity.
This article contends that decisions about hormone therapy for children with
gender dysphoria should be made, in the absence of disagreement between them,
by children, their families and treating medical practitioners, without the need for
application to a court. Two main arguments are raised in support. First, the
extension of Marion’s Case to children with gender dysphoria is based on a
misreading of that decision and is thus legally unwarranted. Secondly, this
expansion of jurisdiction produces harmful effects in the form both of material
social and psychological consequences for individual young people, and in
reinforcing ideas about the need to regulate ‘abnormal’ manifestations of gender
identity.
Accordingly, Part II discusses the expansion of the Family Court’s
jurisdiction – to the exclusion of parental power and children’s own capacity
to consent – so as to encompass decisions relating to treatment for gender
dysphoria. Part III examines in detail the High Court’s reasoning in Marion’s
P26F
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This was acknowledged by the Full Court in Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 184 [138] (Bryant CJ), 192
[185] (Finn J). See also Hewitt et al, above n 5, 578; Insight: Transgender (Directed by Maggie Palmer,
Special Broadcasting Service, 2013) <http://www.sbs.com.au/insight/episode/overview/573/
Transgender#.U5ehzCgbgZY>.
See, eg, Justice Diana Bryant, ‘The Role of the Family Court in Promoting Child-Centred Practice’
(2006) 20 Australian Journal of Family Law 127; Susie O’Brien, ‘Judge: Give Kids More Say’ Herald
Sun (Melbourne), 31 July 2014, 5.
Indeed, Beh and Diamond have observed of the United States that ‘[i]n 2003 some 3700 breast
augmentation surgeries were performed on teenage girls … Males and females, thus, are denied surgery
only if it is associated with a desire to change their sex, not if it is to enhance gender stereotypes’: Hazel
Beh and Milton Diamond, ‘Ethical Concerns Related to Treating Gender Nonconformity in Childhood
and Adolescence: Lessons from the Family Court of Australia’ (2005) 15 Health Matrix 239, 270 n 152.
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Case and how this has been applied by the Family Court. Part IV then turns to
the impact of the decision in Re Jamie and considers when children may be able
to consent to treatment themselves. Finally, Part V advocates the adoption of a
broader interpretation of the right to personal inviolability in understanding and
applying Marion’s Case to children with gender dysphoria.

II THE LIMITS OF PARENTAL POWER
Marion’s Case confirmed the existence of a category of certain medical
procedures to which parents are unable to consent on behalf of their minor
children. 29 The situation arose when the parents of an adolescent girl with
physical and intellectual disabilities, Marion, sought that she be sterilised. The
parents sought a hysterectomy for Marion on the basis that menstruation caused
her pain, psychological distress and associated behavioural problems. 30 Marion’s
family and caregivers were also concerned about the negative impact that
pregnancy and childbirth would likely have upon Marion. 31 Sterilisation would,
of course, also have a contraceptive effect.
Under the common law, consent enables medical treatment which would
otherwise be an assault on a person. 32 If a patient is unable to consent due to
young age or disability, his or her guardian may authorise the treatment. The
objective seriousness or riskiness of the situation is not relevant: parents may
consent to both their child’s heart operation and routine medical check-up.
However, the High Court found that the sterilisation sought for Marion was for a
‘non-therapeutic’ purpose. 33 In so finding, the majority distinguished between
sterilisation as an ‘incidental result of surgery performed to cure a disease or
correct some malfunction’, 34 and the procedure sought for Marion. 35 Had
sterilisation been the necessary consequence of medically approved treatment for
cancer, this would be for a therapeutic purpose, and hence Marion’s parents
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The decision confirmed earlier Family Court determinations in Re Jane (1988) 94 FLR 1 and Re
Elizabeth (1989) 96 FLR 248. Typically, the age of majority is 18 years. In usual circumstances, parents
are able to consent to medical treatment on behalf of their children under 18, such consent being
necessary to vitiate what would otherwise be an assault. If children are ‘Gillick competent’, they may
consent themselves.
Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 229 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
Ibid.
Ibid 233–4 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), 310 (McHugh J).
Ibid 250 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
Ibid 253 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
Ibid 306 (Deane J), 282 (Brennan J), 321 (McHugh J). Justice Deane held that sterilisation for
contraceptive purposes would require court authorisation, Brennan J held that a ‘non-therapeutic’
procedure could not be consented to by the parents nor by the Court, while McHugh J held that the
parents could consent to the procedure if it was for the protection of the child’s physical or mental health.
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could authorise the treatment. 36 A non-therapeutic medical procedure was
different. The High Court held that parents are unable to consent to a procedure
not in the child’s best interests: it is this ‘overriding criterion’ which ‘is itself a
limit on parental power’.37 There may, however, be cases where it is unclear as to
whether the procedure is in the child’s best interests or not. 38 In such instances, it
will be up to a court to make the determination.
A court’s ability to consent on behalf of the minor or incapacitated person
who is the subject of the proposed procedure is founded in the general welfare
jurisdiction of the superior state courts. Deriving from the power and
responsibility of the state to provide care and protection to those unable to do so
themselves, the parens patriae jurisdiction originally exercised by the Court of
Chancery has both a lengthy history and considerable breadth. 39 The judges of the
High Court, save for Brennan J, acknowledged it to be without limit. 40 The Court
held that amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘FLA’) in 1983 had
conferred (as intended) a general ‘welfare’ jurisdiction on the Family Court akin
to the parens patriae jurisdiction, 41 though absent the power to make a child a
ward of court. 42 A child’s welfare could accordingly be ‘an independent subject’
founding proceedings under the FLA. 43 Following further amendments to the FLA
in 1995, this power is now contained in section 67ZC(1). 44 The four-member
joint judgment of the High Court identified the non-therapeutic sterilisation of a
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Ibid 296 (Deane J).
Ibid 240 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
See, eg, the discussion of organ donation in Ian Kerridge, Michael Lowe and Cameron Stewart, Ethics
and Law for the Health Professions (Federation Press, 3rd ed, 2009) 483–4; Re GWW and CMW (1997)
136 FLR 421.
Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 258–9 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). Robert van
Krieken dates the parens patriae jurisdiction back to the 17th century, identifying its first ‘judicial
assertion’ in Falkland v Bertie (1696) 2 Vern 333, 342; 23 ER 814, 818 (Somers LC): Robert van
Krieken, ‘The “Best Interests of the Child” and Parental Separation: On the “Civilizing of Parents”’
(2005) 68 Modern Law Review 25, 27.
Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 258 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), 301–2
(Deane J). Justice Brennan considered this proposition both ‘erroneous in law and disturbing in its social
implications’: at 282.
The Court noted that it was not strictly necessary to determine this issue as at the time the cross-vesting
scheme later impugned by Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 was still in force:
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth); Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987
(NT); Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 254–6 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
It has been held, however, that the absence of this power does not impact on the exercise of parens
patriae: Re W (A Minor) (Medical Treatment: Court’s Jurisdiction) [1992] Fam 64, 73F, 81C (Lord
Donaldson MR).
Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 257 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), citing what
were then FLA ss 63(1), 64(1).
Section 67ZC(1) was inserted by Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) s 31. It was later amended by
Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth) sch 1 cl 38.
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person unable to consent to be a procedure requiring court authorisation. 45
Moreover, the majority concluded that the equivalent jurisdiction to make such a
determination conferred by the FLA did not permit a court to ‘enlarge’ the
powers of a guardian so as to be able to consent. 46 In a separate judgment,
McHugh J considered that parents or guardians could consent to such a procedure
only in the presence of ‘compelling circumstances’, 47 including where there was
a likelihood of the child’s health being seriously jeopardised or the child being in
severe or regular ‘pain, fear or discomfort’. 48 Similarly, Deane J held that parents
could consent to sterilisation if it were, ‘according to general community
standards, obviously necessary for the welfare of the child’.49 If sterilisation were
not so obviously necessary, court authorisation would be required. 50
Justice Brennan, in dissent, found that neither a child’s guardian nor a court
could consent to a non-therapeutic procedure. His Honour held that the ‘welfare
power’ of a court was no wider than that of parents or guardians; a court could
not authorise something contrary to the child’s best interests either under the
common law or pursuant to the FLA. 51 Rather, the jurisdiction is supervisory: a
court can make declarations as to whether, for example, a guardian has the power
to authorise a particular procedure.52
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A The Jurisdiction of the Family Court
Over a decade after Marion’s Case, the then Chief Justice of the Family
Court considered the issue of consent in relation to a very different kind of
medical treatment. 53 A 13-year-old child, Alex, born biologically female, sought
hormone therapy to suppress development of female physical characteristics. 54
Alex had identified as male from a young age and had been diagnosed with
gender identity dysphoria. 55 Having previously been taken into care, Alex’s
guardian was the Secretary of the Department of Health and Community
Services, though he resided with his aunt. It was the Department which brought
the application.
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Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 249 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). Subsequently,
this doctrine has been applied to other medical procedures, including tissue donation and treatment of
children who are born intersex: see, eg, Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart, above n 38, 591–3.
Ibid 257 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
Ibid 321.
Ibid.
Ibid 305.
Ibid 306.
Ibid 283–8.
Ibid 279.
Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89. The issue of authorising surgery in the case of a child with congenital
adrenal hyperplasia had been considered by Mushin J in the earlier decision of Re A [1993] FLC 92-402.
Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 92 [1]–[2] (Nicholson CJ). Surgical procedures prior to Alex turning 18 were
not contemplated: at 92 [3] (Nicholson CJ).
Ibid 92 [2] (Nicholson CJ).
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Chief Justice Nicholson held that the determination about treatment required
consideration first of whether Alex could consent to the treatment himself; and if
not, whether Alex’s guardian could consent on his behalf – ultimately finding
that the guardian could not. On the question of whether Alex could himself
consent, Nicholson CJ referred to the evidence of Alex’s treating doctors,
Professor P and Dr N, but considered both to be somewhat ambiguous on Alex’s
capacity. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, intervening,
submitted that if the Court should find that Alex ‘[had] achieved “a sufficient
understanding and intelligence” to enable him “to understand fully what is
proposed”, then [the] Court has no further role in this matter’. 56 Chief Justice
Nicholson doubted, however, that a 13-year-old would ever have the capacity to
fully understand the implications of a change of sex. 57 The issue of children’s
consent to treatment is discussed further below at Part IV.
In Re Alex, two stages of treatment were discussed: the initial stage of
hormone therapy was agreed to be ‘reversible’ treatment while the latter or
second stage was ‘irreversible’ treatment. Importantly, Nicholson CJ determined
to treat both stages as ‘part of a single package’, 58 noting:
P56F

P57F

P

58F

P

P

P

It was submitted that the evidence showed [Alex] was eager for the treatment to
commence and that if treatment were to commence, he both perceived and wished
it would progress through to the irreversible hormonal treatment contemplated by
the application, unless of course Alex elects to cease the treatment or clinical
contraindications arise. It was also put on the basis of the expert evidence that to
authorise the first stage of treatment but leave the subsequent stages for future
application and determination by this Court would be destructive and anxietyprovoking for him. 59
P59F

Chief Justice Nicholson observed that given Alex conceptualised the
treatment as a single plan, it would be unfair and possibly detrimental to allow
the first stage to proceed only to herald the need for a further application to
determine the ‘second stage’. 60 Reasoning by analogy to Marion’s Case, and
such other case law as was applicable (although none of the cases dealt with
precisely the same issue),61 Nicholson CJ held that Re Alex did involve a ‘special
medical procedure’. 62 Thus, Alex’s guardian could not authorise the procedure
but Nicholson CJ gave court authorisation for treatment to commence.
P60F

P61F

P62F
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Ibid 119 [172] (Nicholson CJ).
Ibid 120 [173].
Ibid 122 [186].
Ibid. This has been reaffirmed by experts testifying in subsequent cases such as Re O (Special Medical
Procedure) [2010] FamCA 1153, [54] (Dessau J) (‘Re O’).
Alex’s case did however return to the court when he subsequently sought authorisation for a double
mastectomy in Re Alex (2009) 248 FLR 312.
Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 120–2 [174]–[182], citing Re A (1993) 16 Fam LR 715; Re Michael (1994)
17 Fam LR 584; Re Michael (No 2) (1994) 18 Fam LR 27; Re W (1997) 136 FLR 421.
Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 116 [152], 123 [190].
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This decision was highly controversial. 63 There was a particular focus by
commentators on Alex’s young age, his family history – which included a very
close relationship with his father, his father’s subsequent death and his rejection
by his mother – and ultimately being taken into care. 64 Concern about Re Alex
also stemmed from differing views of transsexualism, the very existence of
‘gender dysphoria’ and whether and how it ought be treated. 65
Following the decision in Re Alex, a handful of cases involving transgender
children were determined by the Family Court. 66 In each case, authorisation was
given for treatment to proceed.
The parties in the case of Re Bernadette 67 mounted the first direct challenge
to the jurisdiction of the Court, submitting that the power to make the decision
about the child’s hormone treatment was an aspect of parental responsibility. 68
Justice Collier made orders by consent at the conclusion of the hearing in
November 2007 permitting Bernadette, then aged 15, to commence stage one
treatment immediately and stage two treatment from January 2008. 69 However,
his Honour did not deliver final orders and reasons until January 2010, the same
month in which Bernadette turned 18. 70 Accordingly, although the parties lodged
an appeal challenging his Honour’s conclusions about jurisdiction, this was
dismissed by the Full Court holding itself to lack jurisdiction following
Bernadette’s attainment of the age of majority. 71
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Merle P Spriggs, ‘Ethics and the Proposed Treatment for a 13-Year-Old with Atypical Gender Identity’
(2004) 181 Medical Journal of Australia 319; Rachael Wallbank, ‘Re Alex “Through a Looking Glass”’
(2004) 37 Australian Children’s Rights News 28; ABC Radio National, ‘Re Alex; Torts Shopping’, The
Law Report, 20 April 2004, (Damien Carrick) <http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/
lawreport/re-alex-torts-shopping/3377178>.
See, eg, Jen Kelly, ‘Court Backs Sex Swap For Girl, 13’, Herald Sun (Melbourne), 14 April 2004, 3,
reporting that the decision had ‘ignited outrage from ethicists and sex-swap opponents, who feared Alex
was delusional and needed psychiatric help’; Emma-Kate Symons, ‘Sex Change Teenager “Needs Help
Not Surgery”’, The Australian (Sydney), 15 April 2004, 3, reporting comments of John Fleming, Director
of the Southern Cross Bioethics Institute; Editorial, ‘Child Gender Change Takes the Law Too Far’, The
Australian (Sydney), 15 April 2004, 12; Chris Goddard and Joe Tucci, ‘When Too Much Intervention
May Be the Problem’, The Age (Melbourne), 4 May 2004, 11.
See, eg, Sheila Jeffreys, ‘Judicial Child Abuse: The Family Court of Australia, Gender Identity Disorder,
and the “Alex” Case’ (2006) 29(1) Women’s Studies International Forum 1; Nicholas Tonti-Filippini,
John Paul II Institute for Marriage and Family, Gender Reassignment (2009)
<http://www.jp2institute.org/Portals/39/Documents/NTF_Gender_Reassignment.pdf>.
Re Brodie (Special Medical Procedures: Jurisdiction) [2007] FamCA 776; Re Brodie (Special Medical
Procedures) [2008] FamCA 334 (‘Re Brodie’); Re Sean (2010) 258 FLR 192; Re O [2010] FamCA 1153.
Note that pursuant to the administrative protocol between the Family Court and the Federal Circuit Court,
in practice only the former hears these matters.
(2010) 244 FLR 242, affirmed by Re Bernadette (2011) 249 FLR 294.
Re Bernadette (2011) 249 FLR 294, 296 [3] (Bryant CJ and Strickland J).
Re Bernadette (2010) 244 FLR 242.
Re Bernadette (2011) 249 FLR 294, 296 [4]–[5] (Bryant CJ and Strickland J).
Ibid 300 [26] (Bryant CJ and Strickland J).
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After this attempt, a second challenge to jurisdiction was then mounted in Re
Jamie. Similarly to Re Bernadette, Jamie’s parents, having received court
authorisation for treatment to commence, challenged the need for the
authorisation at all, arguing that the power to consent resided in them as Jamie’s
parents. This time, the Full Court did consider the necessity for application to a
court to enable treatment for ‘childhood gender identity disorder’ to proceed. 72
The Full Court unanimously held that stage one (reversible) treatment could be
consented to by the parents, but maintained that stage two (irreversible) treatment
remained a procedure to which only a court or the child could consent. 73
Notwithstanding the finding that, in an appropriate case, a child could himself or
herself consent to the ‘stage two’ treatment, the Full Court held that whether the
child is able to consent must still be determined by a court as a ‘threshold
issue’. 74 Thus, for any stage two treatment to occur prior to the child turning 18,
application must still, in all likelihood, be made to a court.
P72F

P73F

P

P74F

P

P

III A ‘DISEASE’ OR ‘BODILY MALFUNCTION’
As noted, in Marion’s Case, the High Court utilised the language of
‘therapeutic’ and ‘non-therapeutic’ sterilisation, distinguishing the former by
describing it as ‘appropriately carried out to treat some malfunction or disease’.75
Such a distinction had been drawn previously by Nicholson CJ in deciding the
case of Re Jane, also involving a child with an intellectual disability for whom a
sterilisation procedure was sought. 76 The majority commented on their
discomfort with the imprecision of these concepts, but concluded ‘it is necessary
to make the distinction, however unclear the dividing line may be’. 77 In his
separate judgment in Marion’s Case, Deane J opined that the imprecise
distinction between ‘therapeutic’ and ‘non-therapeutic’ surgery ‘may be all but
meaningless’ in the case of psychiatric illness. 78 Commentators have also noted
the limitations and vagueness of the terminology: Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart
observe that ‘[t]he distinction fails to tell us why some treatments need court
P75F
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P78F
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The terminology was used in Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 156 [1] (Bryant CJ). This is notwithstanding
the comments of Nicholson CJ in Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, preferring the use of the term ‘dysphoria’
over ‘disorder’: at 92 [2].
Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 178 [108], 184 [137] (Bryant CJ), 191 [179], 192 [184] (Finn J), 193
[194]–[195] (Strickland J).
Ibid 192 [184] (Finn J), 193 [196] (Strickland J).
Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 250 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
(1988) 94 FLR 1.
Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 250. Note Justice Deane’s view that the common law draws no such
distinction: at 297.
Ibid 296. This reflects the conception of the distinction in the United Kingdom, where it has never been
adopted: Re B (A Minor) (Wardship: Sterilisation) [1988] AC 199, 204 (Lord Hailsham).
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approval and others do not’. 79 Bogdanoski discusses the medicalisation of the
desire for ‘body modification’, suggesting that it is only by rationalising crosssex hormone therapy or surgery as the product of psychiatric abnormality that
society can make sense of it:
P79F

P

Rather than simply accepting the autonomous wishes of patients to … alter their
gender, society is baffled by requests for body modification, and correspondingly
needs to engage in discourses about whether such operations are therapeutic or
non-therapeutic. 80
P80F

In contrast, cosmetic surgeries aimed at ‘normalising’ or enhancing socially
acceptable physical attributes (such as female breast enlargement) are considered
culturally unremarkable. 81 Accordingly, critiques of a ‘medical model’ of
transgender identity reject a pathologising approach and espouse a fluid concept
of gender identity. 82 Yet, as Spade has noted, ‘the reliance on medical evidence
and the medical assessment of gender identity is so deeply entrenched, no legal
strategist can avoid working within requirements of medical documentation at
least sometimes’. 83 Spade goes on to discuss concerns about relying on this
approach to achieve rights for gender diverse people. While important, these
problems are outside the scope of this article, which focuses on the problem of
legal rather than medical regulation and concerns children, rather than adults.
Moreover, the Court’s reliance on medical expertise in the case law indicates that
it acts to replicate this regulation rather than as an independent safeguard, as
noted below.
As a matter of law, it is within the scope of parental power to consent to
therapeutic treatment for a child. Accordingly, the classification of gender
dysphoria as a ‘bodily malfunction’ or as ‘disease’ assumes a central importance.
In determining Re Alex, Nicholson CJ seemed caught by the ‘therapeutic/nontherapeutic’ distinction. His Honour determined that Alex’s condition, which was
deliberately referred to as dysphoria rather than a ‘disorder’, 84 was not a disease. 85
His Honour considered that to label the condition as such would likely be
offensive to gender diverse persons such as Alex, 86 thus resisting the medical
discourse or rationalisation described by Bogdanoski. 87 Yet, by refusing to
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Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart, above n 38, 493.
Tony Bogdanoski, ‘Every Body Is Different: Regulating the Use (and Non-use) of Cosmetic Surgery,
Body Modification and Reproductive Genetic Testing’ (2009) 18 Griffith Law Review 503, 508.
Ibid 509; Beh and Diamond, above n 28, 270 n 152. See generally Dean Spade, ‘Resisting Medicine,
Re/modeling Gender’ (2003) 18 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 15, 15–16.
See, eg, Spade, above n 81; Alvin Lee, ‘Trans Models in Prison: The Medicalization of Gender Identity
and the Eighth Amendment Right to Sex Reassignment Therapy’ (2008) 31 Harvard Journal of Law &
Gender 447.
Spade, above n 81, 18. As Spade explains, in the United States, bringing claims based in disability
discrimination to protect the rights of transgender people puts these issues in focus: at 32–7.
Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 92 [2].
Ibid 124 [195]–[197].
Ibid 124 [197].
Bogdanoski, above n 80, 505.
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accede to the medicalisation or pathologising of Alex’s beliefs about his identity,
Nicholson CJ was also cementing the view of hormone therapy for gender
dysphoria as non-therapeutic, with unfortunate practical consequences. As
Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart observe, this has the corresponding (and also
potentially ‘insulting’) implication that ‘people with gender identity problems …
have been necessarily classified as needing “non-therapeutic” treatment which
sends a message that these illnesses are not real and devastating’. 88
In contrast to Re Alex, the Full Court in Re Jamie clearly accepted and
adopted a ‘medical model’ of gender diversity. The judgment uses the language
of ‘disorder’ throughout, and the Court relied on the inclusion of ‘childhood
gender identity disorder’ as a mental disorder in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-4. 89 Soon after, the American Psychiatric
Association revised this label, explaining that the condition would now be
referred to as ‘gender dysphoria’. 90 The Association noted further that ‘gender
nonconformity is not in itself a mental disorder. The critical element of gender
dysphoria is the presence of clinically significant distress associated with the
condition’. 91
Chief Justice Bryant commented that:
P8F

P89F

P90F

P

P

P91F

it is readily understandable why people with transsexualism are concerned about
the psychiatric diagnoses of gender dysphoria or gender identity disorder, as they
see themselves as merely an example of diversity in human sexual formation,
rather than having a psychiatric condition … However whilst understanding this
discomfort, I do not need to determine whether that characterisation is correct or
not for the purpose of these proceedings … the weight of professional opinion is
that it represents a particular category of pathology or mental illness. 92
P92F

As Bryant CJ noted, the majority in Marion’s Case did not explicitly
consider whether the ambit of the principles being espoused would extend to
treatment of a ‘pathological condition or psychological disorder’. 93 Only Brennan
J appeared to consider this to be the case.94 Nevertheless, Bryant CJ and Finn J
concluded that there was no need to limit the statements of the majority in
Marion’s Case only to ‘physical disease’. 95 Importantly, all three members of the
Full Court in Re Jamie concluded that the ‘therapeutic’ nature of stage one
treatment meant that it was within parental power to authorise treatment on
behalf of the child. 96
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Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart, above n 38, 493.
Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 163 [26], 165 [44], 170–1 [69] (Bryant CJ).
American Psychiatric Association, Gender Dysphoria, above n 1, 1.
Ibid.
Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 170–1 [68]–[69] (emphasis added).
Ibid 172 [74], citing Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 269 (Brennan J).
Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 269.
Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 177 [97] (Bryant CJ), 190 [176] (Finn J).
Ibid 177 [98] (Bryant CJ), 191 [179] (Finn J), 193 [193]–[194] (Strickland J).
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As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, the Full Court in Re Jamie
treated the issue of the ‘stages’ of treatment quite differently to Nicholson CJ in
Re Alex. Following Re Alex, the practice in subsequent cases had been to
consider stage one and stage two treatment as a single issue. Jamie, however, was
only 10 at the time of the original hearing before Dessau J. 97 As it was suggested
that stage two treatment would not be contemplated until Jamie was 16, Dessau J
considered herself unable to be satisfied as to what would be in Jamie’s best
interests six years into the future. 98 Accordingly, a further application to the
Court was foreshadowed to be necessary when Jamie was approaching this age.
Unfortunately, the separate consideration of stages one and two seems
calculated to produce the exact result that Nicholson CJ considered it desirable to
avoid in Re Alex – the creation of uncertainty and hence anxiety 99 – on the part of
Jamie and her family. It is questionable whether delaying the decision could in
fact even act as an additional safeguard. Court authorisation of stage two
treatment would only result in that decision being placed back in the hands of the
child, her family and the treating medical practitioners. Consistent with Chief
Justice Nicholson’s earlier observation, 100 there was no reason to suggest that
Jamie would change her mind about proceeding with treatment, or more
importantly that her family and doctors would not respect her wishes if she did
change her mind. Moreover, if her treating medical practitioners at any time
determined that it would not be in Jamie’s best interests to proceed, treatment
would clearly be refused and hence would not proceed. Any controversy between
child, family and doctors about that would then fall to be resolved, if necessary
by the Court. Absent these circumstances, there could be no relevant issue arising
at a later stage which would cause the Court to reach a different determination
about the child’s best interests than it had at the earlier point in time. Indeed, the
artificiality and irrelevance to the child of focusing on the two stages of treatment
demonstrates a misunderstanding about the nature of gender dysphoria more
generally.
This leads, then, to a more fundamental problem with the Full Court’s
reasoning in Re Jamie which arises in its consideration of stage two treatment.
P97F
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A Therapeutic Treatment
The majority of the High Court in Marion’s Case were clearly focused on
‘non-therapeutic’ procedures, notwithstanding their Honours’ disquiet about the
concept. The judges forming the majority twice distinguished the particular
sterilisation under consideration for Marion from one carried out to remedy
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Ibid 179 [113] (Bryant CJ).
Re Jamie (Special Medical Procedure) [2011] FamCA 248, [130].
Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 122 [186].
Ibid 125 [202].
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disease or illness, 101 which would be a therapeutic procedure, stating: ‘But first it
is necessary to make clear that, in speaking of sterilization in this context, we are
not referring to sterilization which is a byproduct of surgery appropriately
carried out to treat some malfunction or disease’. 102
The majority continued:
P10F

P

P102F

As a starting point, sterilization requires invasive, irreversible and major surgery.
But so do, for example, an appendectomy and some cosmetic surgery, both of
which, in our opinion, come within the ordinary scope of a parent to consent to.
However, other factors exist which have the combined effect of marking out the
decision to authorize sterilization as a special case. Court authorization is required,
first, because of the significant risk of making the wrong decision, either as to a
child’s present or future capacity to consent or about what are the best interests of
a child who cannot consent, and secondly, because the consequences of a wrong
decision are particularly grave. 103
P103F

If, however, the procedure is a therapeutic one, the issues about the risk of
making a wrong decision and the gravity of the consequences should not arise.
Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart observe that in case of children with gender
dysphoria, the Family Court appears to disregard the therapeutic nature of
treatment which would otherwise bring it within the scope of parental consent. 104
This is what occurred in Re Jamie, where having determined the proposed
treatment for Jamie to be therapeutic in nature, the Full Court nevertheless went
on to consider issues relating to risk and gravity.
The majority in Marion’s Case identified the grave consequences adverted to
as being not only rendered unable to procreate but also the very fact of being so
acted upon contrary to one’s wishes. Indeed, the majority stopped short of
recognising a basic human right to procreate, but rather founded their decision in
the right to ‘personal inviolability’.105 In the majority judgment, the irreversible
nature of sterilisation is not given greater weight, at least discursively, than the
loss of control or subjugation of the child to an invasive procedure not in the
child’s best interests. 106
In contrast, in the Family Court decisions the irreversible nature of the
proposed treatment is accorded a key importance. Due to his finding that
hormone therapy was non-therapeutic, Nicholson CJ in Re Alex focused on two
P104F
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Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 250, 253 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
Ibid 250 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) (emphasis added).
Ibid.
Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart, above n 38, 489–90; see also Malcolm K Smith, ‘The Boundaries of
Parental Decision-Making and the Requirement to Obtain Court Approval for “Special Medical
Procedures”: The Recent Decision of Re Jamie [2013] FAMCAFC 110’ (2013) 33(3) Queensland Lawyer
182, 186–7.
105 Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 253 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). Here, the
phrases ‘personal inviolability’ and ‘bodily inviolability’ seem to be used interchangeably. In Re Jane
(1988) 94 FLR 1, Nicholson CJ noted the limitations of considering the issue in terms of a right to
procreate: at 11; and concluded there is a common law right to bodily integrity: at 22–3.
106 Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 252 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
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aspects of the decision in Marion’s Case: the ‘invasive, permanent and
irreversible’ nature of the treatment; and that it was ‘not for the purpose of curing
a malfunction or disease’. 107 The decision of the Full Court in Re Jamie also
hinged on the concept of irreversibility of treatment. In determining that stage
one treatment was treatment within the normal scope of parental authorisation,
Bryant CJ found that:
P107F

P

if the treatment is in response to a disorder, even a psychological or psychiatric
one, it is administered for therapeutic purposes. For that reason alone, in my view,
the treatment at stage one … would not fall within the category of cases which the
High Court was considering in Marion’s case. 108
P108F

If it is found that stage one treatment is administered for a therapeutic
purpose, so too must stage two treatment be. The ‘disorder’ being responded to is
the same one; the purpose does not change just because the treatment may
change. Nevertheless, Bryant CJ found that ‘[t]he complete reversibility, with
few, if any, side effects, of stage one is a significant issue. Stage two is
acknowledged to be different’. 109
Justice Finn was more explicit about the distinction between the stages:
P109F

P

Stage two of the proposed treatment presents greater problems if only because it is
… ‘irreversible in nature’ … This consideration must, in my view, remain
important, even when it is accepted that the treatment can be categorised as
therapeutic, and in this regard the concept of proportionality referred to by
Brennan J must come into play. 110
P10F

Justice Finn was here referring to dicta of Brennan J in Marion’s Case,
wherein his Honour said that ‘“[n]on-therapeutic” medical treatment is
descriptive of treatment which is inappropriate or disproportionate having regard
to the … psychiatric disorder for which the treatment is administered’. 111
This interpretation, however, disregards the broader context of Justice
Brennan’s dissenting judgment, given that his Honour found that neither parents
nor the courts have the power to authorise a non-therapeutic medical procedure
on a person incapable of consent. 112 Justice Brennan held that what is or is not
therapeutic is a question of fact involving consideration of both purpose and
proportionality. 113 Thus, the question of proportionality goes to determining the
initial, fundamental question of whether the treatment is therapeutic, which is
‘determined as a question of medical fact’. 114 It is not to be balanced against
undertaking a therapeutic treatment. Further, Brennan J noted that it could not ‘be
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right’ to prevent a child from undertaking therapeutic treatment by compelling
parents to first obtain leave of a court, 115 an issue discussed below at Part V.
The other judges in Marion’s Case similarly held that parents can consent to
treatment necessary to ‘alleviate pain, fear or discomfort’ (though not if there is a
‘less drastic’ means to avoid the procedure) 116 or if the treatment is ‘so obviously
necessary’ for the child’s welfare. 117 Logically, Justice Brennan’s dicta might
support an argument that stage one treatment is therapeutic because it is
proportionate to the end to be achieved, but stage two treatment is nontherapeutic as its irreversible nature is disproportionate to that same end. This
was not, however, the finding in Re Jamie. Furthermore, even this formulation is
problematic as the emphasis which the Full Court placed on ‘irreversibility’
overlooks the irreversible effect of not undergoing treatment.
P15F

P

P16F

P17F

P

P

B Irreversible Effects
Without treatment, a child wishing to transition from male to female will,
with the onset of puberty, begin to develop masculine characteristics, aspects of
which are irreversible, such as the deepening of the voice. A child wishing to
transition from female to male will develop feminine physical characteristics that
also cannot be reversed, at least without surgical intervention.118
In the context of children with gender dysphoria, to distinguish between
reversible and irreversible treatment is not a useful way to determine whether the
treatment is itself therapeutic. In contradistinction to the situation in Marion’s
Case, for children with gender dysphoria, not receiving treatment is irreversible
just as receiving treatment is irreversible. As Shield has argued, adolescents ‘will
forever see the mark of this delay on [their] body’. 119 Moreover, and importantly
in light of the perceived connection between the ‘sterilisation cases’ and the
‘gender dysphoria’ cases, the second stage of hormone therapy does not
necessarily result in irreversible sterilisation, although it is likely that with
prolonged use of hormones fertility will diminish and eventually be lost
altogether. 120 Yet by focusing on the concept of irreversibility, the Family Court
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Ibid 278.
Ibid 309 (McHugh J).
Ibid 306 (Deane J).
It is further suggested that ‘[i]mperfect physical outcomes are a primary cause of post-operative mental
health issues’: Shield, above n 9, 379, citing Cohen-Kettenis and van Goozen, above n 18, 264; Yolanda
L S Smith, Stephanie H M van Goozen and Peggy T Cohen-Kettenis, ‘Adolescents with Gender Identity
Disorder Who Were Accepted or Rejected for Sex Reassignment Surgery: A Prospective Follow-Up
Study’ (2001) 40 Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 472, 472–3.
119 Shield, above n 9, 362–3.
120 Johanna Olson and Michelle Forcier, Up To Date Clinical Decision Support Resource, Overview of the
Management of Gender Nonconformity in Children and Adolescents (20 November 2014)
<http://www.uptodate.com/contents/overview-of-the-management-of-gender-nonconformity-in-childrenand-adolescents>.
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sidesteps the logical consequence of the finding that hormone therapy for gender
dysphoria is therapeutic, which is that a court need not make the determination.
The weight placed on irreversibility is all the more remarkable if one
considers that if a child is diagnosed as having gender dysphoria, the diagnosis of
itself determines the possible treatment. That is, the diagnosis stems from the fact
that the desire of the child for his or her physical characteristics to correspond to
his or her inner subjective feelings about his or her gender is so strong, physical
change may be the best and indeed only method by which to preserve his or her
mental health, and possibly life. As a medical professional quoted in Re Lucy 121
opined, ‘[u]ntreated Gender Dysphoria invariably progresses to immense
disillusionment and then, to chronic depression which can often progress to
Major Depression, with significant suicidal risk’.122 The recent survey of Smith et
al found not only extremely high reports of suicidal thoughts amongst young
gender diverse people but also of suicide attempts. 123 In gender dysphoric
children, the development of secondary sexual characteristics may increase
unhappiness with the body and ‘comorbid’ symptoms (such as body dysmorphia
and other obsessional disorders), 124 as well as ‘depression, anxiety, self-harm,
suicidality, substance use and high risk sexual behaviors’. 125 Thus, the
seriousness of a ‘change’ of gender is seen as more grave than all of these welldocumented risks.
The disaggregation of stages one and two, and the overwhelming concern
with irreversibility, has a more subtle effect too, serving to reinforce norms about
the essentially binary nature of social conceptions of gender. 126 The focus of the
decision shows that any concept of gender fluidity is anathema – a person may be
one gender or another, and the critical part of the decision is around when that
may occur, hence the preoccupation with ‘stage two’.
Stage one treatment can only provide a holding pattern, and like a holding
pattern, for a finite amount of time. As Nicholson CJ correctly observed in
relation to Alex, 127 children, their families and their treating medical practitioners
do not enter into stage one treatment absent the intention to at least consider
continuing to stage two treatment: the diagnosis in and of itself imports this. This
is reflected in research suggesting that gender dysphoria existing since childhood
and which is exacerbated rather than diminished with puberty, is unlikely to
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Medicine 171; Kenneth J Zucker, ‘The DSM Diagnostic Criteria for Gender Identity Disorder in
Children’ (2010) 39 Archives of Sexual Behavior 477.
126 Senate Community Affairs References Committee, above n 1, 13 [1.51]; though note the recent decision
of the High Court in Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (NSW) v Norrie (2014) 250 CLR 490.
127 Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 122–3 [188]–[189].
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subside. 128 A prospective follow-up study of 70 gender dysphoric young people
found that all elected to proceed to cross-sex hormone therapy following
hormonal suppression of puberty. 129 In the only Australian study, which predated
Re Jamie, 17 out of 21 young people ‘experienced persistence of profound
[gender dysphoria] with increased distress following commencement of puberty
and were therefore considered eligible for hormone treatment’.130
The artificiality of distinguishing between the two stages, as far as the child
involved is concerned, is apparent. There is little utility in undertaking stage one
treatment without this being followed by stage two treatment, other than to buy
more time. While this may be necessary and appropriate in a treatment context,
in a legal sense, drawing a distinction between stages one and two has the effect
only of delaying the decision that a court will eventually be called upon to make.
Yet, as discussed below, the Full Court in Re Jamie had reason to encourage this
delay.
P128F

P

P129F

P
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IV GILLICK COMPETENCE AND CONSENT
In the gender dysphoria cases, it has been accepted (and confirmed in Re
Jamie) that children or young people may be able to consent to hormone
treatment themselves while still minors, but the circumstances in which this will
be possible are not defined with precision. 131 This imprecision arises from the
approval in Marion’s Case of a test of ‘Gillick competence’ set out by Lord
Scarman in that decision: 132 ‘A minor is, according to this principle, capable of
giving informed consent when he or she “achieves a sufficient understanding and
intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed”’. 133
In Re Alex, Nicholson CJ was not satisfied on the evidence that Alex was
able to fully comprehend the effect of the treatment envisaged. However, his
Honour was not required to fully determine whether Alex could consent to
treatment, as it was found both that Alex wanted the treatment and that it was in
his best interests. 134
As was argued by the appellants in Re Jamie, the situation of children with
gender dysphoria is arguably starkly different to that of children (and indeed
P13F

P132F

P

P

P13F

P134F

128 Spack et al, above n 14; Annelou L C de Vries and Peggy T Cohen-Kettenis, ‘Clinical Management of
Gender Dysphoria in Children and Adolescents: The Dutch Approach’ (2012) 59 Journal of
Homosexuality 301; Thomas D Steensma et al, ‘Desisting and Persisting Gender Dysphoria after
Childhood: A Qualitative Follow-Up Study’ (2011) 16 Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry 499.
129 De Vries et al, above n 14, 2276.
130 Hewitt et al, above n 5, 579.
131 Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 116 [155] (Nicholson CJ).
132 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 1 AC 112.
133 Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 237 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ), citing Gillick v
West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1986] 1 AC 112, 189 (Lord Scarman).
134 Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89, 99 [49].
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adults) with intellectual disabilities considered in the ‘sterilisation’ cases. The
High Court in Marion’s Case proceeded on an assumption that Marion would
never attain the ‘competence’ to be able to consent to treatment herself. 135 Gender
diverse children, by contrast, can be expected to draw nearer to attaining Gillick
competence as they age.
Jamie herself was, as noted, only 10 at the time of the initial application. This
is reportedly not uncommon: the years from 10 to 13 are likely to be a critical
time for children displaying childhood gender non-conformism. 136 Jamie’s
treating doctors did not envisage ‘stage two’ treatment commencing until she
reached the age of 16, which is the age proposed in Endocrine Society clinical
guidelines. 137 This is also the age at which, in some Australian jurisdictions,
children are presumed to be able to consent to medical treatment, 138 as Bryant CJ
noted in her judgment. 139 Her Honour further explained, in a sensitive passage,
that there is no reason why a competent child should not be able to make his or
her own decision about commencing stage two treatment:
P135F
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P137F
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one might think that, of all the medical treatments that might arise, treatment for
something as personal and essential as the perception of one’s gender and
sexuality would be the very exemplar of when the rights of the Gillick-competent
child should be given full effect. 140
P140F

The positing of 16 as the typical age for stage two treatment to commence
seems to have struck the Full Court as a useful escape route from the quagmire of
judicial decision-making in such cases. If parents can consent to stage one
treatment, and stage two treatment would typically proceed when the child is at
an age where he or she is likely to be able to consent, then a court might not be
required to make a determination about treatment at all. In Re Lucy, handed down
just weeks before Re Jamie, Murphy J found that allowing Lucy to undergo
reversible treatment would provide a ‘hiatus’ until the child is ‘Gillick
competent’ or becomes an ‘adult’. 141
Yet it becomes quickly apparent that any ostensible relinquishment of control
over this area of decision-making is illusory, as the Full Court held that the
P14F

135 The problems inhering in such an immutable view of disability are discussed elsewhere: see Linda Steele,
‘Making Sense of the Family Court’s Decisions on the Non-therapeutic Sterilisation of Girls with
Intellectual Disability’ (2008) 22 Australian Journal of Family Law 1.
136 Steensma et al, ‘Quantitative Follow-Up Study’, above n 14, 582–4. Hewitt et al report that patients
presented to their specialist Melbourne clinic at a mean age of 10 years: Hewitt et al, above n 5, 580.
137 Wylie C Hembree et al, ‘Endocrine Treatment of Transsexual Persons: An Endocrine Society Clinical
Practice Guideline’ (2009) 94 Journal of Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism 3132. The same is
proposed in a Dutch protocol: Henriette A Delemarre-van de Waal and Peggy T Cohen-Kettenis,
‘Clinical Management of Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescents: A Protocol on Psychological and
Paediatric Endocrinology Aspects’ (2006) 155 European Journal of Endocrinology 131.
138 See Minors (Property and Contracts) Act 1970 (NSW) s 49; Consent to Medical Treatment and Palliative
Care Act 1985 (SA) s 6.
139 Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 183 [130]–[131].
140 Ibid 183–4 [135] (Bryant CJ).
141 Re Lucy (2013) 286 FLR 327, 349 [93].
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decision about whether or not a child is indeed Gillick competent is one that must
be made by the Court itself. 142 Both Bryant CJ and Finn J described themselves as
reluctant to reach this conclusion but bound by Marion’s Case on the issue, 143
Finn J describing the latter as enshrining:
P142F

P

P143F

P

the requirement … for court authorisation for irreversible medical treatment in
circumstances where there is a significant risk of the wrong decision being made
as to the child’s capacity to consent to the treatment and where the consequences
of such a wrong decision are particularly grave … 144
P14F

In a short concurring judgment, Strickland J repeated this finding. 145
Such an analysis of Marion’s Case overlooks the fact that the High Court
was concerned only with what was found to be a non-therapeutic procedure. In
the Family Court’s interpretation, the concept of ‘irreversible’ treatment seems to
be substituted for ‘non-therapeutic’ treatment.
As quoted above, the majority in Marion’s Case described non-therapeutic
sterilisation of a child with an intellectual disability as carrying a ‘significant risk
of making the wrong decision, either as to a child’s present or future capacity to
consent or about what are the best interests of a child who cannot consent’. 146
These two issues are not clearly distinguished from one another in the ensuing
discussion, but earlier in their judgment the majority had dealt at some length
with the reasons why the decision about capacity to consent will be more difficult
to make in the case of a child with an intellectual disability. 147 Having described
the Gillick test, the majority noted that ‘the fact that a child suffers an intellectual
disability makes consideration of the capacity to consent a different matter’. 148
The majority explained that this was due to the widely differing capabilities of
children with disabilities, who cannot be treated as homogenous. 149 Importantly,
their Honours concluded ‘there is no reason to assume that all disabled children
are incapable of giving consent to treatment’. 150
Of even greater import, perhaps, the majority identified the risk of making
the wrong decision in such cases and expressed caution about assuming medical
professionals would always make ‘correct’ decisions. 151 This derived from the
judges’ awareness of ‘misconceptions on the part of others in society’ 152 about
persons with intellectual disabilities and the fact that such misconceptions are
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Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 184 [136]–[138] (Bryant CJ)
Ibid 184 [137] (Bryant CJ), 192 [184]–[186] (Finn J).
Ibid 192 [186].
Ibid 193 [196].
Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 250 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
Ibid 238 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
Ibid (emphasis added).
Ibid.
Ibid (emphasis added).
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likely to be heightened when it comes to issues involving sexuality or sexual
identity. 153
The majority therefore clearly distinguish the assessment of competency in
the case of children with intellectual disabilities from the assessment of those
without. It is the presence of intellectual disability as well as the context of the
decision to be made that creates the ‘significant risk of making the wrong
decision’ as to competency. 154 Marion’s Case does not mandate a finding that
such a risk is automatically present in cases involving children with gender
dysphoria nor the asserted consequence that it is for a court alone to make the
assessment of competence.
From its earliest consideration of these types of cases, the Family Court has
been relatively reluctant to find children able to consent to treatment for gender
dysphoria. The nature of the way that the decisions had always been considered
prior to Re Jamie meant that it was unnecessary to make definitive findings about
children’s consent, as the Court would always have material available to
determine that treatment was nevertheless in children’s best interests. Thus, the
procedure seems to have been to consider whether the child is ‘capable of
making an informed decision’ concerning treatment, 155 but in the knowledge that
the Court was not authorising something which the child did not want or which
was not also appropriate.
P153F

P154F
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A Conflicting and Coincident Interests
One concern of the majority in Marion’s Case was that the interest of parents
and families in the child undergoing sterilisation might be different from, or in
conflict with, the interests of the child herself.156 Appropriately, the High Court
was exceedingly concerned about the improper treatment of children with
disabilities. 157 Mandating application to a court is for the purpose of ensuring
protection against an abuse of rights – primarily, the right to ‘bodily
inviolability’. 158 Justice Brennan, who considered that no one could have the
power to permit non-therapeutic sterilisation, referred to ‘the law’s protection of
the human dignity of the intellectually disabled child’. 159
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153 Ibid 239 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
154 Ibid 250 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
155 Re Rosie [2011] FamCA 63, [100] (Dessau J); Re O [2010] FamCA 1153. Though note cases post-Re
Jamie where the Court has made a declaration as to the child’s competence: Re Spencer [2014] FamCA
310; Re Colin [2014] FamCA 449.
156 There was evidence, for example, that sterilisation would make the job of Marion’s family in caring for
her less onerous: Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 251–2 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and
Gaudron JJ).
157 Ibid 253 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
158 Ibid 233, 248–9 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
159 Ibid 273.
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Again, however, the situation of gender dysphoric children is not analogous,
particularly when the ‘irreversibility’ of both proceeding or not proceeding with
treatment is considered. This is illustrated by the distressing situation of the child
in the early case of Re A, decided by Mushin J. 160 A natal female, A, had been
born with congenital adrenal hyperplasia, causing him to develop masculine
characteristics. Due to receiving inadequate hormone treatment as a child, these
characteristics became more pronounced and thus, as a 14-year-old, A was forced
to apply to the Family Court seeking further surgical procedures to enable him to
present as a male. 161 Justice Mushin was critical of A’s parents for not
appropriately adhering to the treatment plan for A and the ‘appalling situation’
that A subsequently found himself in. 162
For gender dysphoric children, the decision about treatment options cannot
be delayed beyond a certain point without this affecting the outcome, nor is there
a ‘less invasive’ option for consideration. Indeed, as one of Jamie’s treating
doctors explained, to withhold hormone treatment ‘would be experienced as quite
“invasive” in itself [due to] the unwanted masculinisation of her body’. 163
The eugenicist overtones imported by the sterilisation of girls with
disabilities which so concerned the High Court 164 are not present. Arguably,
parents and doctors are rather responding appropriately to children’s expression
of their gender and severe distress and unhappiness with their body. 165 The
appellants in Re Jamie submitted that the only benefit to them of Jamie
undergoing treatment was to have a child who was well and not unhappy. 166 In
the case of Re O, the evidence was that:
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The past two years for O have been dogged by periods of significant depression
and suicidal thoughts associated with his gender identity. O has reported to his
treating psychiatrist, Professor P, disgust about his body. … O has told him that
‘at times he feels his life is not worth living because of the feeling of being
trapped in the wrong body’. 167
P167F

It is common in the case law for children to have reported suicidal thoughts
and sometimes suicide attempts. 168 It seems likely also that the court process
P168F

P

160 Re A [1993] FLC 92-402.
161 The procedures sought were ‘bilateral mastectomies, a hysterectomy and oophorectomy, unfolding of the
clitoris to increase its length and to relieve pain caused by erections, a closure of the labia to create the
appearance of a scrotum and the insertion of prosthetic testes’: Re A [1993] FLC 92-402, 80 113.
162 Ibid 80 114.
163 Re Jamie [2011] FamCA 248, [86] (Dessau J).
164 Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 275 (Brennan J), 295, 300–3 (Deane J), 321 (McHugh J).
165 See Shield, above n 9, 372. Shield makes a persuasive argument for the medical necessity of hormone
therapy for adolescents with gender dysphoria. See also Laura R Givens, ‘Why the Courts Should
Consider Gender Identity Disorder a Per Se Serious Medical Need for Eighth Amendment Purposes’
(2013) 16 Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 579.
166 Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 163 [27] (Bryant CJ).
167 Re O [2010] FamCA 1153, [60]–[62] (Dessau J).
168 Re Rosie [2011] FamCA 63; Re O [2010] FamCA 1153; Re Sam [2013] FamCA 563; Re Spencer [2014]
FamCA 310. See also Hewitt et al, above n 5, 578; Smith et al, above n 3, 12, 17–18.

2015

Children with Gender Dysphoria and the Jurisdiction of the Family Court

449

would contribute to children’s distress and anxiety due to a perception that a
court may not permit or allow the treatment sought, 169 as well as the attendant
stress placed on their family. It is inhumane that children must experience the
level of suffering described in the case law before being permitted to access
treatment, and would seem to be inconsistent with the child’s ‘best interests’. 170
This is distinct from a situation involving conflicting views about the
diagnosis and treatment of gender dysphoria for a child, where it may be
appropriate that a court’s powers are invoked. The Family Court’s mandate is,
inter alia, to resolve disputes relating to the parenting of children. Thus, similarly
to case law involving other types of medical procedure, if for example parents
have differing views about the type of treatment that is appropriate, it may be
necessary for application to be made to a court for determination of the issues. 171
This is, however, quite different to requiring children and parents to apply to the
Court under section 67ZC(1) of the FLA for permission to undergo treatment
which everyone is agreed upon. If there is a debate about whether a particular
treatment is indeed therapeutic or not, for example due to parental disagreement
about treatment, this gives rise to a situation more appropriate for a court to
consider if only because of the failure to agree on a major long-term issue in the
child’s life. Otherwise, it is unacceptable that children must endure years of
suffering before being permitted access to hormone therapy, or more pertinently
post-Re Jamie, whether they will be allowed to continue treatment which has
commenced in the form of ‘stage one’.
To date, there is a general absence of countervailing viewpoints in the cases
involving children with gender dysphoria. In Re Alex, Alex’s mother was
reported to be unsupportive of Alex’s gender identification, but she no longer had
parental responsibility, could not be located and did not participate in the
proceedings despite being named as respondent. 172 Aside from this, the reported
cases have tended to involve children, parents, medical practitioners, family
report writers, independent children’s lawyers and concerned intervenors such as
the Human Rights Commission, 173 who concur in supporting treatment.
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169 See Re A [1993] FLC 92-402, 80 114, 80 116–7; Re O [2010] FamCA 1153, [60]–[62] (Dessau J).
170 FLA s 67ZC(2).
171 This has occurred in the United States. See, eg, Shannon Shafron Perez, ‘Is It a Boy or a Girl? Not the
Baby, the Parent: Transgender Parties in Custody Battles and the Benefit of Promoting a Truer
Understanding of Gender’ (2010) 9 Whittier Journal of Child and Family Advocacy 367, 392–3; David
Alan Perkiss, ‘Boy or Girl: Who Gets To Decide? Gender-Nonconforming Children in Child Custody
Cases’ (2014) 25 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 57, 70–4; Skougard, above n 6, 1161–2. These authors
all discuss Smith v Smith (Ohio Ct Common Pleas, Case No. 01 DR 86, 4 September 2004), affirmed by
Smith v Smith (Ohio Ct App, Case No. 05 JE 42, 23 March 2007).
172 The evidence was that Alex’s mother had rejected him which led to his being taken into care: Re Alex
(2004) 180 FLR 89, 101 [62], [65] (Nicholson CJ).
173 The Human Rights Commission intervened in Re Alex (2004) 180 FLR 89 and Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR
155; an unnamed public authority was also permitted to intervene in Jamie’s case: Re Jamie (2012) 257
FLR 41.
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The significance of this is not that parents and guardians are uniformly
supportive of childhood manifestations of gender non-conformism. In fact, the
opposite is likely to be true. 174 If parents or guardians lack understanding of
gender dysphoria or the particular treatment recommended, a child is unlikely to
be sufficiently supported to access treatment, let alone the court process. 175
Rather, it illustrates the practical limits of the protective function that a court is
intended to fulfil in such cases. Though Family Court proceedings are sometimes
described as semi-inquisitorial, judges are confined to making determinations on
evidence appropriately brought before the Court. 176 In Re A, Mushin J
commented on the attendant difficulty faced by the Court when there was nobody
to put a ‘contrary view’. 177 Where all the evidence tends in a single direction
only, it is hard to see what independent safeguard a court can provide. Though it
is typical for the Family Court to appoint an independent children’s lawyer to
represent the child’s interests in such cases, these lawyers have always been
supportive of the child accessing treatment. 178
It is also to be remembered that in each reported case, it is the child or young
person in question who has been the main instigator of the process, at times
contrary to the wishes, at least initially, of his or her parents. Indeed, displaying
‘strong cross-gender identity from an early age’ 179 forms part of the diagnostic
criteria for gender dysphoria. Again, by definition, these young people have spent
many years thinking about who they are and what they want in terms of their
gender identification.
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174 Smith et al report that 25 per cent of gender diverse young people in their survey reported being abused at
home because of their gender orientation: Smith et al, above n 3, 60.
175 De Vries, Cohen-Kettenis and Delemarre-van de Waal report ‘clinical consensus’ that a precondition to
commencing hormone therapy for adolescents is that the young person lives in a supportive environment:
Annelou L C de Vries, Peggy T Cohen-Kettenis and Henriette Delemarre-van de Waal, ‘Clinical
Management of Gender Dysphoria in Adolescents’ (2006) 9(3–4) International Journal of
Transgenderism 83, 85–6.
176 See Maluka v Maluka [2012] FamCA 373.
177 [1993] FLC 92-402, 80 116.
178 Though also of the court’s jurisdiction: note the independent children’s lawyer in Re Jamie supported
stage one treatment commencing but submitted that the matter should return to court for the
determination about stage two treatment, in contrast to Jamie’s parents and doctors: Re Jamie [2011]
FamCA 248, [9]–[10] (Dessau J). Appointing an independent children’s lawyer can be contrasted with
the approach of Wilson J in determining an application brought in the parens patriae jurisdiction of the
Queensland Supreme Court concerning the termination of a child’s pregnancy wherein her Honour
determined it was appropriate that she appoint ‘a contradictor’: Queensland v B [2008] QSC 231, [25].
179 De Vries, Cohen-Kettenis and Delemarre-van de Waal, above n 175, 85.
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V CONCLUSION: THE RIGHT TO PERSONAL
INVIOLABILITY
The significance of continued judicial control over decision-making in this
area cannot be underestimated. In terms of practical consequences, there is
considerable expense, time and distress associated with applying to the Family
Court. 180 This is not alleviated by reference to the small numbers of children
making application to the Court or the fact that the Court has never refused to
permit treatment in a gender dysphoria case.181 Generally, it is suggested that the
relative numbers of adolescents receiving treatment for gender dysphoria is low,
and often patients present later on, when suppression of puberty will be less
effective. 182 In Australia, Hewitt et al reported (pre-Re Jamie) that some families
did not pursue hormone treatment due to the cost and stress of making a court
application. 183 Thus many young people, as a medical practitioner opined in Re
Brodie, ‘just suffer out there’. 184
Although the Chief Justice in Re Jamie foreshadowed that applications
concerning a child’s capacity to consent ‘would only need to address the question
of Gillick competence and once established the court would have no further
role’, 185 two problems can be immediately identified. First, although her Honour
was suggesting that less evidence would be required, this does not diminish the
need for an applicant to instruct solicitors, obtain advice, make application to the
Court and produce evidence in proper form. Expense, stress and time are unlikely
to be considerably diminished.
Secondly, there remains uncertainty surrounding the decision that a court will
actually make. In the cases to date, as discussed above, the Family Court will not
necessarily find a child competent to make such a life-altering decision. Children,
parents and lawyers would thus be unwise to proceed to a hearing of the
application without being able to lay their hands on the further evidence needed
to demonstrate that treatment is in the child’s best interests in the event that the
claims about competency are not accepted. To prepare the case on a more limited
basis could lead to a situation where, if a court finds a child is not competent to
make the decision, a second application would need to be made.
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180 This has been the consistent argument of lawyer Rachael Wallbank, who acted for Bernadette: Wallbank,
above n 63, 28; see also sources cited in n 26. The cost and delay associated with making a court
application was also noted by the High Court in Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 253 (Mason CJ,
Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
181 At least insofar as the reported case law suggests.
182 Daniel E Shumer and Norman P Spack, ‘Current Management of Gender Identity Disorder in Childhood
and Adolescence: Guidelines, Barriers and Areas of Controversy (2013) 20 Current Opinion in
Endocrinology, Diabetes & Obesity 69, 71.
183 Hewitt et al, above n 5, 580.
184 Re Brodie [2008] FamCA 334, [231] (Carter J).
185 Re Jamie (2013) 278 FLR 155, 163 [139] (Bryant CJ).
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The majority in Marion’s Case discussed the importance of the right
to bodily or personal inviolability by reference to the serious implications
of ‘violation’ of the right. It was recognised that such impacts extend beyond
the physical to ‘serious questions of a person’s “social and biological
identity”’, 186 and attendant social and psychological effects. Their Honours
observed that sterilisation ‘is not merely a medical issue’. 187 The Court was,
after all, considering an ‘invasive’ medicalised procedure (an hysterectomy)
undertaken for ostensibly ‘non-medical’ (and, the judges concluded, nontherapeutic) reasons, including concerns about the potential effects of
menstruation, pregnancy and childbirth on Marion.
In applying the principles of Marion’s Case to the situation of gender
dysphoric children, the right to personal inviolability needs to be reconsidered
in light of a very different set of circumstances. Yet the serious questions
about ‘identity, social place and self-esteem’ 188 remain entirely relevant. As two
commentators have noted, such procedures:
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are not simply for the purpose of curing an illness or improving health, but are
inextricably associated with the patient’s self-identity. The consequences of not
allowing treatment where that is sought or alternatively, of carrying out treatment
where that is not wanted, can be terrible, having consequences lasting throughout
a person's lifetime and affecting not only health, fertility and the ability to have a
fulfilling sex life, but also psychological well-being and identity. 189
P189F

In the case of gender dysphoric children, having treatment or not having
treatment both result in some irreversible physical effects. To deny young people
the opportunity to access treatment is to deny the opportunity to develop the
physical characteristics of the person they already see themselves as being; or
indeed, know themselves to be.
A broader conceptualisation of the right to personal inviolability would
encompass the idea of a right to control one’s own body, whether this is to
restrict or prevent an invasive procedure or to access treatment that will result in
alterations to one’s physical characteristics. 190 The majority in Marion’s Case
referred to ‘a right to do with one’s person what one chooses’. 191 This is
commensurate also with the right to access medical treatment regardless of
whether the treatment transgresses social norms about gender identity.
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Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 252 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
Ibid 251 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ) (emphasis in original).
Ibid 252 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
Kate Parlett and Kylie-Maree Weston-Scheuber, ‘Consent to Treatment for Transgender and Intersex
Children’ (2004) 9 Deakin Law Review 375, 396.
190 Other commentators have called for this in the context of transgender rights: see, eg, Alston, above n 8;
Milton Diamond and Hazel Glenn Beh, ‘The Right to Be Wrong: Sex and Gender Decisions’ in Sharon E
Sytsma (ed), Ethics and Intersex (Springer, 2006) 103.
191 Marion’s Case (1992) 175 CLR 218, 254 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
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This is not to suggest that hormone therapy is appropriate for all children
exhibiting gender non-conforming behaviour. 192 The point is that decisions about
the appropriate therapy for individual children are ones that should be made
collectively by children, parents and treating medical professionals, absent
disagreement amongst them. The diagnosis of gender dysphoria already imports
a clinical level of distress and attendant risk. As Murphy J noted in Re Sam:
‘Each of the experts identifies that the proposed treatment not only accords with
the clinical practice guidelines, but is, at present, the only treatment available for
individuals suffering from Gender Dysphoria’. 193
As Millbank observed following the decision in Re Alex, hormone therapy
carries some risks and some unknowns, but ‘to ignore a child in this deep
distress, in suicidal distress, is also experimenting in the cruellest way on
children’. 194 Hewitt et al also note that the long-term outcomes of hormone
therapy are unknown, but continue:
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These do not seem equitable or just reasons for restricting a young person’s access
to medical care. Furthermore, a young person observing the distress that court
application causes for the parents may feel uncomfortable expressing any doubts
they have regarding hormone treatment. 195
P195F

That is, once court approval is obtained, a young person may actually feel
less able to cease the treatment given the expenditure and stress he or she has
caused to his or her parents or guardian to be able to proceed in the first place.
The decision in Re Jamie is a step in the right direction, but growing medical
consensus, the absence of alternate viewpoints and evidence in the reported
cases, and the established serious risks of harm to children who are not able to
access treatment, all mitigate against the Court continuing to play any role in
determining whether treatment can proceed. If hormone therapy in this context is
accepted as being therapeutic, it cannot be right, as Brennan J observed, to insist
that children obtain the Court’s permission to undergo that treatment. 196 The
Court’s expansion of its jurisdiction to encompass treatment for gender dysphoria
is not fulfilling its stated function of protecting children. Rather, it is causing
further distress and harm.
As noted, Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart suggest that the distinction
between therapeutic and non-therapeutic procedures is unhelpful. 197 Instead, they
recommend that specific types of medical intervention be listed or included
in regulations specifying whether judicial permission is required before they
P196F
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be undertaken or performed on children or incapacitated persons. 198 This may,
indeed, be the preferable course.
Regardless of whether the therapeutic/non-therapeutic distinction remains as
a matter of law, commencing treatment for gender dysphoria in children is a
decision that children, their parents or guardians and a multidisciplinary team of
medical professionals should make, not the courts.
P198F

198 Ibid 493–5.
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